

9 May 1977

A Reaction to: Draft Paper, "The Role of
the DCI..." (PRM-11, Task 2)

An organizational analysis of the roles of the DCI which contains a total of six passing references in 116 pages to the National Foreign Intelligence Board can be read as betraying a basic ignorance of the nature of the intelligence community which the DCI is intended to lead and a lack of understanding of the role of the community in assisting the DCI in the performance of his primary responsibility, the production of national intelligence.

A non-organizational analysis, which would properly regard no institution as enduring, should concentrate on the DCI's major responsibilities and the authorities he needs to carry out his responsibilities. If he is to be the President's principal foreign intelligence advisor, he is, above all, responsible for the production of national intelligence. He must have the authority to direct the intelligence community's activities in the production of national intelligence with corollary authority to set collection requirements in priority order and to allocate resources as required.

The DCI controls the production of national intelligence with the advice of the intelligence community; the structure of the advisory body is a proper subject for an organizational analysis.

The DCI controls the allocation of resources aimed at supporting the production of national intelligence through an existing structure, which is also subject to organizational analysis.

What needs most careful consideration is the strengthening of the DCI's role by giving him the authority to ensure that what is put in by way of resources is determined by the need to put out national intelligence.

In an organizational analysis, whatever the final result, a re-affirmation of the need for PRC (Intelligence) requires that attention also be paid to the NFIB. Otherwise, an existing flaw will be preserved. Resource allocation cannot remain independent of the DCI's responsibility for substantive national intelligence. The strongest structure would link the two. The DCI could then delegate his authority, but never his responsibility.

Walter Elder

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Remarks:

Walt's messings

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